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The Sequence of Economic Liberalization  
in a Developing Country with Incomplete Financial Market 
 
Yue Ma* 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, an incomplete financial market model was built to 
illustrate the impacts of the market incompleteness on the benefits of trade 
liberalization. Particularly, it will focus on the investigation of the impacts 
of different sequences of opening up the goods market. That is, should the 
government open up international trade simultaneously with the opening 
up the domestic trade, i.e. implementing a “shock therapy” approach? Or 
should the government liberalize the domestic goods market first, then to 
deregulate the international trade, i.e. following a “gradualism” approach? 
This paper proves that the gradualism approach by opening domestic 
goods market before liberalization the international trade can guarantee 
the successive improvement of everyone’s welfare. Therefore the 
gradualism approach is a Pareto improvement sequence. 
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1. Introduction 
In the WTO agreement that the Chinese government signed at the 
end of 2001, the commitment is to open up the Chinese domestic market to 
foreign producers and to liberalize the international trade. This policy 
clearly is in the spirit of Ricardo’s free trade theory based on comparative 
advantage. In reality, the comparative advantage is not easy to be defined 
and identified unambiguously. There are always uncertainties and risks. 
However, the risk can be fully insured in a complete financial market 
according to Arrow-Debreu’s contingent market theory. Hence, trade is 
always better-off to everyone. 
This argument becomes less strong, however, if one realizes that a 
developing economy such as China has a financial market that is far from 
complete. For example, the derivatives market in China is completely 
underdeveloped. The bond market is tiny. The foreign exchange market is 
restricted. Therefore, it is an urgent research topic to reconsider the main 
conclusions of economic theory based on the complete market assumptions 
for the developed economies when one makes policy recommendations for 
a developing country’s government. 
Here a good example of China is Professor Peng Shige from 
Shangdong University discovered some abnormalities in the international 
derivatives markets in the early 1990s that would generate substantial 
losses to the Chinese trading firms who were not aware of the problems. 
He wrote to the officials in charge and subsequently the trading was 
stopped and the potential losses were effectively avoided (Xu, 2005). 
In this paper, I will build an incomplete financial market model to 
illustrate the impacts of the market incompleteness on the benefits of trade 
liberalization. Particularly, I will focus on the investigation of the impacts 
of different sequences of opening up the goods market. That is, should the 
government open up international trade simultaneously with the opening 
up the domestic trade, i.e. “shock therapy” approach? Or should the 
government liberalize the domestic goods market first, then deregulate the 
international trade, i.e. following a “gradualism” approach? 
It is well-known that if the financial market is incomplete, there is no 
guarantee that more markets will generate Pareto-optimum outcome 
(Magill and Quinzii, 1996). In fact, Hart (1975) found an example that as 
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more markets opened, all consumers are effectively worse-off. Hence the 
sequence of market liberalization is path-dependent (Duffie and Rahi, 
1995). 
 The main findings of this paper are that both international and 
domestic trade are better than no trade even in the incomplete market 
economy. However, if a government adopts the “shock therapy” approach 
to open up the international and domestic trade simultaneously, it faces a 
risk of welfare loss in comparison with the outcome of the gradualism 
liberalization approach. This paper proves that the gradualism approach by 
opening domestic goods market before liberalization the international trade 
can guarantee the successive improvement of everyone’s welfare. That is, 
the gradualism approach is a Pareto improvement sequence. 
The conclusion of this paper is also consistent with recent research 
findings on the Chinese gradualism reform approach. For example, Lau, et 
al (2000) found that the dual-track approach adopted by China in her 
transition process towards the full market economy is a Pareto 
improvement sequence. The gradualism approach was adopted in China to 
reform her agricultural sector first (Lin, 1992), and then to reform her 
industrial sector (Rawski, 1994). This is to win the political support of the 
majority of the rural population for further more difficult and controversial 
reforms in the urban area. As a result, the successful gradualism approach 
of pro-globalization and pro-entry into the global economy has reduced the 
number of poor in China by 150 million, which contributed significantly to 
the global poverty reduction (see, for example, Fischer, 2003). It has been 
well-recognized that this gradualism strategy has been implemented more 
effectively than the ‘shock therapy’ strategy adopted in eastern European 
economies (Parente and Rios-Rull, 2005; Lau, et al, 2000).  
The main findings of this paper are also consistent with the empirical 
findings that emphasize on the importance of the sequence of trade 
liberalization for other developing countries (e.g., Krueger, 1997; Lee, 
2004). For decades after World War II, Latin America’s Southern Cone 
countries (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) pursued inward-looking policies 
that relied heavily on government interventions. As a result, each economy 
suffered frequent balance of payments crises, hyper-inflation, and low 
economic growth. Starting from 1970s, these governments attempted to 
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switch from import-substitution industrialization strategy to a more neutral 
one by engaging in a sequence of liberalizing external sectors first, but 
domestic macroeconomic stabilization later. There were rapid financial 
market deregulation and reduction of trade barriers (Corbo and de Melo, 
1985).  This sequencing of reform led to a persistent real exchange rate 
appreciation, current account deficits, a large build-up of external debt, and 
eventual default in the debt crises in the 1980s (Corbo, de Melo, and 
Tybout, 1986; Edwards, 1989). 
Nevertheless, international experiences of “shock therapy” approach 
also have successful examples. For instance, New Zealand endured a 
combination of high inflation and low economic growth in the 1970s. The 
policy response of the National Party was active interventionist to fix 
wages, prices, exchange rates, rents, interest and dividends. That led to an 
early election under the short notice in 1984 with 93.7% turnout, an 
indication of the desire by voters for a change of economic policy (Miller, 
2005).  The Labour Party under the leadership David Lange won a 
landslide victory in the election and quickly implemented a rapid 
programme of deregulation and public-sector restructuring (Evans, et al, 
1996). It was argued that any delay of liberalization, as gradualism 
suggests, there would have been time for the opposing forces within the 
Labour Party to block the reforms or severely limit them (Lange, 1996). 
That is because these “shock therapy” reforms adopted monetarist 
approaches to control inflation, to sell state assets, and to remove tariffs 
and subsidies. They were strongly opposed by traditional Labour 
supporters. However, the implementation of these liberal reforms by a 
‘wrong’ party perhaps was more credible as voters knew that the ‘left-
wing’ Labour Party would pay more attention to the social welfare than the 
‘right-wing National Party (see Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) that 
provided a theory to explain this apparent incongruity). In the end, the 
Labour Party led by David Lange was re-elected for a second term in 1987. 
It is left for future research to embed the credibility of government policy 
in the simple model developed in this paper. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds 
a simple two-period model with heterogeneous consumers and incomplete 
financial market.  Section 3 provides the theoretical analysis of the model 
 5
solution. Section 4 conducts a Monte Carlo simulation. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. A heterogeneous consumer model with incomplete financial market 
In my simple model, there are two countries. The domestic country 
has less developed economy with two types of consumers (i and j), two 
goods (1 and 2), and two states (v and w). Yet the financial market is 
incomplete with just one asset (see Ma (2007) for a full description of the 
model). As the focus is on the domestic economy, the foreign country is 
modeled as simple as possible. It is assumed that foreign country is a 
developed economy with just one type of consumer (f) who also consumes 
two goods. There are two periods in the model: the initial time period and 
the first time period. Consumers in both countries enjoy utility of 
consumption in the first period only. The utility of consumer k (=i, j and f) 
is given as follows: 
uk(s) = k1α ln )(1 sxk + (1- k1α )ln )(2 sxk ,   
where consumer k=i, j, f, and state s=v, w. k1α  is the preference of 
consumer k for good 1 . )(sxkh  is consumer k’s consumption of good h in 
state s. 
The expected utility is given by: 
Uk = αk uk(v) + (1-αk)uk(w),   
where αk is the probability of state v that is believed to occur by consumer 
k, and the three consumers are disagreed on the this probability, i.e., 
αi≠αj≠αf. Therefore, it is a model with heterogeneous consumers.  
Consumer k’s endowment vector is ( )(1 sek , )(2 sek ) if state s occurs.  
  In the financial market, there is only one asset. One unit of the asset 
yields r(s) unit of monetary return in state s. Clearly this single asset cannot 
span the state space. Complete market should have 2x2=4 contingent 
markets in the Arrow-Debreu world, or 2 (assets) + 2 (spots) = 4 markets 
in a Rander equilibrium. With a single asset in my model, the financial 
market is therefore incomplete.  
The budget constraint of consumer k in state s is therefore given as 
follows: 
Ωk(s) = p1(s) )(1 sek + p2(s) )(2 sek  + r(s) kAq  = p1(s) )(1 sxk + p2(s) )(2 sxk  + pA kAq ,  
or, 
 6
δΩk(s) = p1(s)[ )(1 sek - )(1 sxk ]+ p2(s)[ )(2 sek - )(2 sxk ]+[r(s)- pA] kAq  = 0,  
where Ωk(s) is the total wealth of consumer k including the net gains from 
asset transaction, ph(s) is the spot price of good h in state s, )(sekh  and )(sxkh  
are endowment and consumption of good h for consumer k in state s, 
respectively, r(s) is the return of asset in state s, pA is the price of asset, kAq  
is the quantity of asset held by consumer k. kAq >0 indicates consumer k 
purchases kAq  of asset; kAq <0 means consumer k sells kAq  of asset to the 
market.  
In the following section, we will focus on the solution of sequential 
economy. In a sequential economy, consumers make a consumption plan 
based on the anticipated prices of consumption goods with rational 
expectations. They will share their risk partially through the incomplete 
financial market in the initial period. The spot markets then open at the 
subsequent time period. Consumers will fulfill their financial obligations at 
the financial market and will buy and sell consumption goods at the spot 
market. Therefore, the long-run equilibrium is achieved through a series of 
short-run transactions. 
However, the sequential economy of trade liberalization can be taken 
place by two different strategies. One of the strategies is to open up the 
international trade immediately, a ‘shock therapy’ approach. Another one 
is to adopt a ‘gradualism’ approach by opening up the domestic trade first 
and then to open up the domestic market to international traders. In an 
incomplete market setting like my model presented here, we will show the 
consequences of these two strategies are quite different.  That is, the 
outcome is path dependent.   
 
3. Trade strategies in an incomplete financial market 
 
3.1. ‘Shock therapy’ liberalization strategy 
Under this strategy, the domestic government will open up the 
international trade immediately, starting from autarky position. Consumers 
in both countries will maximize their utilities subject to the budget 
constraint defined in the previous section.   
Form the Lagrangian for consumer k’s (k=i, j, f) optimization 
problem as 
 7
Lk = αkuk(v) + (1-αk)uk(w) + λk(v) δΩk(v) + λk(w) δΩk(w)  
     =αk k1α ln )(1 vxk + αk(1- k1α )ln )(2 vxk  + (1-αk) k1α ln )(1 wxk + (1-αk)(1- k1α )ln )(2 wxk   
       +λk(v) { p1(v)[ )(1 vek - )(1 vxk ]+ p2(v)[ )(2 vek - )(2 vxk ]+[r(v)- pA] kAq } 
       +λk(w) { p1(w)[ )(1 wek - )(1 wxk ]+ p2(w)[ )(2 wek - )(2 wxk ]+[r(w)- pA] kAq } 
The first-order necessary conditions for the consumption choices are 
then 
∂Lk/∂ )(1 vxk  =0 => )(1 vxk =αk k1α /[λk(v)p1(v)], 
∂Lk/∂ )(2 vxk  =0 => )(2 vxk =αk(1- k1α )/[λk(v)p2(v)], 
∂Lk/∂ )(1 wxk  =0 => )(1 wxk =(1-αk) k1α /[λk(w)p1(w)], 
∂Lk/∂ )(2 wxk  =0 => )(2 wxk =(1-αk)(1- k1α )/[λk(w)p2(w)], 
Substituting )(sxkh  into the budget constraints, we can solve out λk(s) 
  λk(v) = αk /[ p1(v) )(1 vek + p2(v) )(2 vek  +[r(v)- pA] kAq ], 
  λk(w) = (1-αk)/[ p1(w) )(1 wek + p2(w) )(2 wek  +[r(w)- pA] kAq ], 
There are three market equilibrium conditions for goods 1 and 2, as 
well as for the asset market. Setting the spot price of good 1 as numeraire, 
the equilibrium condition for goods market 2 is: 
)(2 sx
i + )(2 sx j + )(2 sx f = )(2 sei + )(2 se j + )(2 se f , 
which solves for p2(s) as follows: 
p2(s)= {(1- i1α ) )(1 sei +(1- j1α ) )(1 se j +(1-β1) )(1 se f +( i1α iAq + j1α jAq +β1 fAq )  
[pA -r(s)]} / [ i1α )(1 sei + j1α )(1 se j +β1 )(1 se f ] 
The first-order necessary conditions for the asset holdings are 
∂Lk/∂ kAq  =0 => λk(v)[r(v)- pA] + λk(w)[r(w)- pA]=0, 
The asset market equilibrium is  
 iAq + jAq + fAq =0 
Solving this nonlinear simultaneous equation system will obtain the 
equilibrium of the ‘shock therapy’ strategy. 
Proposition 1. All consumers will not be worse-off after the 
international trade, comparing with the no-trade autarky. 
This proposition is easily proven as all consumers have maximized 
their utility after trade, their utility levels are at least as high as that of 
endowments before trade.  
 
3.2. Partial liberalization strategy of opening domestic trade only 
Under this strategy, there is only trade between domestic consumers i 
and j. International trade is not permitted. The first-order conditions for 
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domestic consumers are the same as before, but the market equilibrium 
condition is changed to: 
)(2 sx
i + )(2 sx j = )(2 sei + )(2 se j , 
which solves for p2(s) as follows: 
    p2(s)= {(1- i1α ) )(1 sei +(1- j1α ) )(1 se j +( i1α iAq + j1α jAq )[pA -r(s)]} / [ i1α )(1 sei + j1α )(1 se j ] 
The asset market equilibrium becomes  
 iAq + jAq =0 
Solving this new nonlinear system will obtain the equilibrium of the 
domestic trade. 
Proposition 2. All consumers will not be worse-off after the 
international trade, comparing with the no-trade autarky. 
This proposition is similar to Proposition 1, although the trade is 
restricted to domestic trade only. However, it is difficult to compare the 
benefits from international trade with the domestic trade theoretically. That 
is, international trade may not be a Pareto improvement over the domestic 
trade, and vice versa. This remains an important empirical question to be 
investigated later in Section 4. 
 
3.3. Gradualism reform strategy to open up the international trade 
This strategy will open the domestic market for domestic consumers 
as the first stage of liberalization process. The solution of this intermediate 
stage is obtained from subsection 3.2. The solution of the domestic trade 
effectively generates the new endowments for domestic consumers for 
their second-stage trade, which will be trade with both domestic consumers 
and foreign consumers. The solution of the second-stage international trade 
can be obtained from subsection 3.1, with initial endowments being 
replaced by the equilibrium from the first stage domestic trade.  The final 
equilibrium therefore is obtained through a sequence of solving two 
nonlinear systems.  
Proposition 3. Gradualism reform strategy is a Pareto improvement 
process for domestic consumers.  
 Proposition 2 provides the proof for the conclusion that the first stage 
domestic trade is a Pareto improvement for both domestic consumers. 
Based on the endowments from the domestic trade, the consumers continue 
to maximize their utilities from international trade. Therefore, both 
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domestic consumers will not be worse-off after the international trade, 
comparing with the domestic trade.  
The key question now is which liberalization strategy, the shock 
therapy one or the gradualism one, generates more benefits for domestic 
consumers, and for foreigners.  Given the complexity of the nonlinear 
system, there is no analytical solution available for the model to answer 
this question. A Monte Carlo simulation is therefore conducted in the next 
section with two real economies’ structures as background. 
 
4. Monte Carlo simulation 
This section reports the results from a Monte Carlo simulation for the 
theoretical model built in the previous section. The economic background 
of the simulation is based on the empirical regional data from China (the 
domestic economy) and Japan (the foreign economy) in 2003. The regional 
disparity in the Chinese economy provided a natural complementarity for 
her domestic trade. Furthermore, it is well-known that China adopted the 
open door policy since 1978 and negotiated to have joined the WTO at the 
end of 2001. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate whether China 
should open up her domestic market first before further liberalizing her 
market for international trade. The foreign economy is chosen as Japan as 
the Japanese economy is one of the economies with lowest income 
inequality among the industrialized countries (Akita and Kataoka, 2003). It 
is therefore consistent with the simple assumption of the theoretical model.  
The two types of consumption are chosen as goods and services, 
which are two most important consumptions of a modern economy. The 
latest regional data for Japan is 2003 and therefore Chinese data is chosen 
for 2003 accordingly. Therefore are 31 provinces, autonomous regions, and 
municipalities in mainland China. The mean, standard deviation, minimum, 
and maximum values of GDP per capita for goods and services across 31 
regions in mainland China are presented in Table A. The data source is 
China Statistical Yearbook 2004, published by National Bureau of 
Statistics (2004).  In Japan, there are 47 regional prefectures with various 
levels of GDP per capita for both goods and service. Table A also presents 
their mean, standard deviations, minimum, and maximum values. The data 
source is Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts 2005, published by 
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Government of Japan (2006). The geographical location of the regions of 
Japan and China are given by Fig 1 and 2, respectively. 
Comparing the two economies in Table A, two interesting results can 
be observed. The first one is that Japanese income per capita is 
substantially higher than that of China. In fact, average regional GDP per 
capita is around 31 times of that in China. The second one is that Japanese 
regional disparity in terms of standard deviation is much lower than that in 
China. For Japan, the ratios of the highest to lowest GDP per capita for 
goods and services are 4.4 and 3.2 times, respectively, which are 
substantially lower than the corresponding ratios of 10.3 and 17.8 times in 
mainland China. Therefore, China has a long way to catch up both the 
level of income as well as the equality of income distribution of Japan.  
For the Monte Carlo simulation, a model is constructed with a 
similar structure of the theoretical model built in the previous section. 
There are two (groups of) consumers (labeled as i and j) in domestic 
economy of China. There is one group of consumers in the foreign country 
Japan (denoted as f). Truncated normal distributions are assumed for the 
preferences of consumers, the expectations of the probability of the 
occurrence of the two states, v and w, the endowments of goods and 
services for all consumers, and the return of assets in the two states. The 
normality assumption is consistent with the law of large samples. The 
truncation is imposed for the preference and probability due to their (0, 1) 
bound. The truncations for the endowments are imposed by the minimum 
and maximum levels of GDP per capita in goods and services of the two 
countries. The only ad hoc assumption for the truncation of asset returns is 
to distinguish a ‘good’ return (below one yet still positive) and a ‘bad’ 
return (above one but less than 2). Similarly, endowments vary in these 
two states too.  
Specifically, the preference of consumers for goods is assumed to be 
a standard normal distribution with truncation of [0.1, 0.9]. The asset 
return in a ‘good’ state (v) has a standard normal distribution with 
truncation of [1, 2]. Whilst a ‘bad’ state (w) will have the return with a 
standard normal distribution with truncation of [0.1, 0.9]. For the 
distribution of endowment, the simulated the sample has the truncation of 
empirical minimum and maximum values of regional GDP per capita for 
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goods and services respectively. Furthermore, the simulated the sample has 
been matched with the empirical mean and standard deviation as close as 
possible based on the following criteria: 
SQE=(µsimu - µempirical)2+(σsimu - σempirical)2 
where SQE is the sum of squared error,  µsimu and σsimu are the mean and 
standard deviation of simulated sample, respectively,  µempirical and σempirical 
are the mean and standard deviation of the empirical data of regional GDP 
per capita. 
In the Monte Carlo simulation, 1,000 independent pseudo-random 
numbers are generated for each of the variables. The statistics of the 
simulated sample are presented in Table 1. For each set of random 
variables of the preferences of consumers, the expectations of the 
probability of the occurrence of the two states, v and w, the endowments of 
goods and services for all consumers, and the return of assets in the two 
states, the utility derived from no trade (autarky) is calculated for each 
consumer and is presented in column (1) of Table 2. If the domestic market 
is liberalized directly to international trade following a so-called ‘shock 
therapy’ strategy, domestic consumers i and j are able to engage in 
domestic and international trades simultaneously. That is, they can trade 
with each other as domestic trade as well as trade with foreigner f in the 
international trade. The result is then obtained along the optimal solution 
from the theoretical model and is presented in column (2) of Table 2.  
However, an alternative open door policy is to follow a ‘gradualism’ 
approach and to open up the domestic trade first before the international 
trade. The intermediate result of opening the domestic trade only is 
presented in column (3) of Table 2. The final outcome of liberalizing the 
domestic market to international trade, following the opening of domestic 
trade, is presented in the last column of Table 2. A quick look of the three 
different trade policies in column (2) to (4) against the outcome of autarky 
in column (1) indicates clearly that any trade is better than no trade. Any 
trade generates an upward shift of the mean, the minimum, and the 
maximum values of the utility of any individual consumer against their 
corresponding levels in autarky. This fact is confirmed Table 3, in which 
the differences between the utility of trade and autarky are calculated. The 
 12
mean and minimum values of the utility differentials are all positive in 
columns (1) to (3). 
To test whether this upward shift of the utility is significant, a formal 
test is necessary to carry out. There are two issues we need to consider 
before choosing an appropriate test. The first issue is that consumers i and j 
in fact belong to one country.   A comparison of welfare across different 
policies should treat them as a pair. That is, the significance of their gains 
from trade should be considered jointly for both of them, rather than being 
considered separately.  
The second issue is whether the distribution of the upward shift in 
the utility is normal distribution. If this were the case, then a parametric 
test such as Hotelling’s T2 test (Hotelling, 1931), which is a multivariate 
version of the univariate t-test, can be applied. Unfortunately, the 
normality tests on the utility differentials of Table 4 based on skewness and 
kurtosis both failed at the 5% level for all individuals. As a result, a more 
sophisticated non-parametric version of the Hotelling’s T2 test described by 
Zwick (1985) is applied in this study. It is a rank multivariate analysis to 
test the significance of the positive gains in utility form trade. The rank test 
results are also reported in Table 3. Interestingly, it is found that both 
Chinese consumers i and j have significant benefit from any trade, 
according to the χ2(2) tests. The Japanese consumer f nevertheless has no 
significant benefit, as shown by the χ2(1) tests.  This is probably due to the 
fact that the income level of Chinese consumers is substantially lower than 
their Japanese counterparts. The trade benefits therefore are significant for 
low income consumers.  
Nevertheless, the conclusion that trade is better than no-trade perhaps 
is not surprising at all. It was discovered by David Ricardo (1817) nearly 
200 years ago. It is also proven by the theoretical model in the incomplete 
financial market structure in the previous section. The important issue is to 
compare different sequences of liberalizing policies since the outcome is 
path-dependent in an incomplete financial market structure. This exercise 
is carried out in Table 4. Using the benchmark of the partial liberalization 
policy of opening the domestic trade, columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 
indicate that this is inferior to both full liberalization policies of shock 
therapy strategy and gradualism reform for Chinese consumers. The 
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difference in utility of full liberalization and domestic trade is always 
positive. Furthermore, the non-parametric test indicates that the both full 
liberalization policies generate higher utilities that that of domestic trade 
for the Chinese consumers significantly at the 5% level. This resolves an 
important empirical question and concludes that full liberalization is better 
than partial liberalization.  
Finally, Table 4 compares the utility levels of shock therapy strategy 
and gradualism reform. It can be observed that there is clear a trade-off 
between the two liberalization strategies. In column (3) of Table 4, the 
maximum values of the utility differential for both domestic consumers are 
positive. It shows there are occasions that the shock therapy strategy can 
make at least one domestic consumer worse-off in comparison with the 
gradualism strategy. Nevertheless, the gradualism reform cannot be 
dominant the shock therapy strategy. The minimum values of the utility 
differential in column (3) of Table 4 for both domestic consumers are all 
negative. It means that shock therapy strategy can generate better outcome 
for at least one consumer.  
Interestingly, the utility levels of these two strategies are not 
significantly different at the 5% level for both Chinese and Japanese 
consumers according to the non-parametric rank test. This implies both full 
liberalization strategies reach similar final outcomes and cannot be 
discriminated statistically.  
However, this conclusion deserves some qualification if one looks at 
the columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 carefully. In column (1) of Table 4, the 
minimum values of the utility differential for both domestic consumers are 
negative. It shows there are occasions that the shock therapy strategy can 
make at least one domestic consumer worse-off in comparison with the 
domestic trade. This implies that the outcomes from shock therapy strategy 
are not always preferred for the at least one of domestic consumers. That is, 
the shock therapy strategy is not a Pareto improvement in relation to 
domestic trade equilibrium.  
In contrast, the minimum values of the utility differential in column 
(2) of Table 4 for both domestic consumers are always positive. This 
confirms our Proposition 3 that gradualism reform is a Pareto improvement 
over domestic trade, which is also a Pareto improvement over no-trade 
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autarky. It clearly shows that the outcome of full liberalization is path-
dependent when the financial market is incomplete.  
Furthermore, the standard deviation of gradualism reform is lower 
than that of shock therapy strategy (cf. Table 2), implying that the outcome 
under this policy is also more stable than the shock therapy approach. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Based on a simple incomplete financial market model, this paper 
demonstrates that the full trade liberalization is path-dependent. Although 
both shock therapy and gradualism approaches reach to a statistically 
similar equilibrium with higher utility for all consumers, the gradualism 
approach may be preferred since it is a Pareto improvement process for 
domestic consumers. Both the theoretical results and the Monte Carlo 
simulations confirm this conclusion. The policy implication for a 
developing economy such as China is profound. It means that the 
government should open its domestic market for domestic consumers first 
before opening it to international trade. Domestic trade provides a solid 
foundation for the domestic consumers to face the opportunity and 
challenges from the international trade with foreign traders.  
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Fig 1. Map of Japan 
 
Tourism is one of Nara's largest industries. 
A number of major companies have factories in Shiga such as IBM Japan, Canon. 
Tokyo’s GDP of around US$1.315 trillion is greater than the 8th largest national economy in 
the world. It is a major international/domestic finance center, and serves as a hub for Japan's 
transportation, publishing, and broadcasting industries. 
Source: Servas Japan Organization: www.servas-japan.org/images/japan-trip.gif
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Fig 2. Map of China 
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Table A. Disparity of regional GDP per capita (in ‘000 US$) in goods and services: China vs Japan 
  China   Japan  
sample size  31   47  
 goods services total goods services total 
statistics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
mean   0.834   0.596 1.429   7.909 21.828 29.737 
min  0.282 (Guizhou) 
  0.154 
(Guizhou) 
  0.435 
(Guizhou) 
  3.589 
(Tokyo)
16.886 
(Nara) 
21.796 
(Nara) 
max 2.913 (Shanghai) 
2.732 
(Shanghai) 
5.645 
(Shanghai)
15.655 
(Shiga) 
53.490 
(Tokyo) 
57.079 
(Tokyo)
st. dev.   0.538   0.587 1.097   2.832   5.317   5.441 
Gap ratio 
(max/min) 10.3 17.8 13.0 4.4 3.2 2.6 
 
Table 1. Heterogeneous preferences, expectations, endowments, and asset returns 
(sample size: 1,000 ) 
  Preference Expectations Endowments 
    state v state w 
(A) Statistics   goods services goods services
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
mean 0.4998 0.5003 0.9002 0.7101 0.9165 0.7130
st. dev. 0.1473 0.1287 0.4562 0.4188 0.4955 0.4158
min 0.1024 0.1549 0.2820 0.1539 0.2828 0.1549
Consumer i 
max 0.8965 0.8322 2.5391 2.5752 2.6776 2.6661
mean 0.4984 0.5035 0.9098 0.7140 0.9203 0.6960
st. dev. 0.1492 0.1328 0.4655 0.4205 0.4632 0.4091
min 0.1124 0.1319 0.2825 0.1536 0.2818 0.1536
Consumer j 
max 0.8895 0.8710 2.8253 2.5787 2.7924 2.0845
mean 0.5042 0.4965 7.8073 22.7001 7.8525 22.4878
st. dev. 0.1504 0.1476 2.7816 4.3186 2.8267 4.2695
min 0.1093 0.1079 3.6109 16.8923 3.6096 16.9094
Foreigner f 
max 0.8926 0.8988 15.5328 38.3985 15.5915 43.0573
mean   1.4913 0.4994 
st. dev.   0.1880 0.1543 
min   1.0016 0.1059 
(B) 
Asset return 
max   1.9913 0.8993 
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Table  2. Simulated utilities (sample size: 1,000 ) 
  Autarky 
International 
trade under 
shock therapy
Domestic 
trade only 
International 
trade under 
gradualism 
reform 
 Statistics (1) (2) (3) (4) 
mean -0.3714 0.0378 -0.2810 0.0395 
st. dev. 0.2948 0.3647 0.2760 0.3262 
min -1.3324 -0.8527 -1.1742 -0.8389 
max 0.5000 1.4256 0.5791 1.1275 
skewness -0.0326 0.2312 -0.0320 0.0962 
Consumer i 
kurtosis -0.2885 -0.0043 -0.2255 -0.1445 
mean -0.3687 0.0417 -0.2744 0.0435 
st. dev. 0.3049 0.3727 0.2791 0.3326 
min -1.3513 -0.9348 -1.2973 -0.8747 
max 0.5092 1.5943 0.5290 1.6011 
skewness -0.0670 0.2073 -0.1373 0.1642 
Consumer j 
kurtosis -0.2729 0.1663 -0.0407 0.3388 
mean 2.5455 2.5542  2.5539 
st. dev. 0.2218 0.2153  0.2156 
min 1.7995 1.8279  1.8238 
max 3.1024 3.10303  3.10304 
skewness -0.3155 -0.2572  -0.2607 
Foreigner f 
kurtosis 0.1287 0.0531  0.0587 
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Table  3. Difference in utility between trade and autarky (sample size: 1,000 ) 
  
International trade 
under shock 
therapy strategy 
Domestic trade 
only 
International trade 
under gradualism 
reform 
 Statistics (1) (2) (3) 
mean 0.4092 0.0905 0.4109 
st. dev. 0.3148 0.0800 0.2465 
min 0.0034 0.0006 0.0216 
max 1.8287 0.6193 1.5555 
skewness 1.2661 1.6791 1.0355 
Consumer i 
kurtosis 1.6611 3.9298 1.2096 
mean 0.4104 0.0943 0.4123 
st. dev. 0.3140 0.0909 0.2471 
min 0.0034 0.0003 0.0181 
max 1.8126 0.6160 1.5940 
skewness 1.2401 2.0575 1.0220 
Consumer j 
kurtosis 1.5918 5.5280 1.2408 
Joint test for 
uktrade=ukautarky, 
k=i,j 
χ2(2) 858.23 85.91 858.17 
P-value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
mean 0.0088 0.0084 
st. dev. 0.0112 0.0108 
min 0.000028 0.000026 
max 0.1277 0.1250 
skewness 4.0799 4.2473 
Foreigner f 
kurtosis 28.7792 31.4037 
χ2(1) 0.6124 0.5622 Test for 
Uftrade=ufautarky P-value 0.4339 
n.a. 
0.4533 
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Table  4. Difference in utility of various trade reforms (sample size: 1,000 ) 
  
Shock therapy 
strategy 
vs 
domestic trade 
only 
Gradualism reform
vs 
domestic trade only
Gradualism reform
vs 
shock therapy 
strategy 
 Statistics (1) (2) (3) 
mean 0.3187 0.3204 0.0017 
st. dev. 0.3073 0.2383 0.1793 
min -0.3528 0.0021 -0.5953 
max 1.5328 1.5124 0.6360 
skewness 1.1029 1.1493 0.0006 
Consumer i 
kurtosis 1.3376 1.3711 0.7664 
mean 0.3161 0.3180 0.0018 
st. dev. 0.3063 0.2366 0.1822 
min -0.3939 0.0039 -0.6423 
max 1.6915 1.4887 0.8720 
skewness 1.1092 1.1852 0.2481 
Consumer j 
kurtosis 1.5154 1.5395 1.4774 
χ2(2) 596.02 618.07 0.2516 Joint test for 
uktrade=ukautarky, 
k=i, j P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.8818 
mean -0.0004 
st. dev. 0.0011 
min -0.0119 
max 0.0018 
skewness -5.0328 
Foreigner f 
kurtosis 36.4233 
χ2(1) 0.0023 Test for 
Uftrade=ufautarky P-value 
n.a. 
0.9616 
 
